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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 20, 2015, Plaintiff/Appellant Richard T. Wright ("Wright") filed his
Opening Brief on Appeal against Defendant/Appellee, Ada County, arguing that the district court
erred in granting Ada County's motion for summary judgment on Wright's claims made
pursuant to the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, Idaho Code § 6-2101, et. seq. Ada
County filed Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief defending the court's grant of summary
judgment and appealing the court's denial of attorney fees on or about October 15, 2015. Wright
now submits this Reply Brief on Appeal and respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Ada County and for remand to the district
court for further proceedings. Wright further requests that this Court affirm the district court's
denial of attorney fees to Ada County.

II.ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Erred in Finding that Wright did not Participate in
an Investigation Under Idaho Code§ 6-2104(2).

Ada County first asserts that "[t]he crux of the issues on appeal is whether the
specific, codified legislative intent of the Whistleblower Act (Idaho Code § 6-2101) applies to
the whole of the Whistleblower Act or whether Idaho Code § 6-2104(2), which protects an
employee's participation in an investigation, should be interpreted in isolation to allow for causes
of action that far exceed those specified in the intent of the Act."

See Respondent/Cross-

Appellant's Brief, p. 9 (emphasis added). The clear error in Ada County's argument is apparent
within its :framing of the issue because nothing in the codified legislative intent in Idaho Code §
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6-2101 specifies the intent of the Legislature regarding the protection of employees participating
in investigations, court proceedings, or legislative hearings.

L

The Whistleblower Act created three different types of causes of
action for public employees.

Ada County argues that "the Act only authorizes a cause of action for adverse
employment actions that result from a report of waste or a violation of law, rule or regulation."

See Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief, p. 10. This is entirely inaccurate. As was set forth in
detail within the Appellant's Opening Brief, the Whistleblower Act protects employees from
adverse employment actions in three different situations. Specifically, Idaho Code § 6-2104(1)
provides that a public employer cannot take adverse employment action against an employee
who makes a report of waste, or a violation of law, rule or regulations. Idaho Code § 6-2104(2)
protects employees from adverse employment actions if they participate or give information in
an investigation, hearing, court-proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form of
administrative review.

Lastly, Idaho Code § 6-2104(3) protects employees from adverse

employment actions if they refuse to engage in actions which they, in good faith, reasonably
believe would result in a violation of law, rule or regulation. Each of these statutory provisions
is a separate provision within the Whistleblower Act and each very clearly and specifically
provides for a cause of action under the Act.

As such, there can be no question that the

Whistleblower Act provides for far more than a single cause of action for "adverse employment
actions that result from a report of waste or a violation oflaw, rule or regulation."
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The sole basis for Ada County's contention that the Whistleblower Act creates
only a single cause of action is the legislative intent codified in Idaho Code § 6-2101. Idaho
Code§ 6-2101 provides:
The legislature hereby finds, determines and declares that
government constitutes a large proportion of the Idaho work force
and that it is beneficial to the citizens of this state to protect the
integrity of government by providing a legal cause of action for
public employees who experience adverse action from their
employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule
or regulation.
LC. § 6-2101. Nothing in this provision indicates that the legislature intended to provide only a
single cause of action.

The only intent codified by this provision is the intent to protect

employees who report waste or a violation oflaw, rule or regulation. However, nothing in Idaho
Code § 6-2101 evidences any intent by the Legislature to limit the Whistleblower Act protections
to only those employees who report waste or a violation of law, rule or regulation. Rather, the
best evidence that the legislature did not intend to limit the Whistleblower Act to a single cause
of action is the legislature's own actions in creating not just Idaho Code§ 6-2104(1) which fully
accomplishes then purpose set forth in Idaho Code § 6-2101, but also codifying Idaho Code §§
6-2104(2) and (3 ). Had the legislature intended to only protect reports of waste or violations of
law, rule or regulation, the Whistleblower Act would never have included subsections (2) and (3)
of§ 6-2104.
Ada County spends considerable time asserting that Wright's reliance on the
express language of Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) is an attempt to give an "independent
interpretation" to that provision beyond the intent expressed in Idaho Code§ 6-2101. However,
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Wright is not asking this Court to do anything other than apply the words of the statutory
provision as written and enacted by the legislature. As Ada County itself admits, "[l]anguage of
a particular section need not be viewed in a vacuum." Lockhart v. Dep 't of Fish and Game, 121
Idaho 894, 897, 828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992). Ada County is asking this Court to view Idaho
Code § 6-2101 as the sole evidence of what the Legislature intended to accomplish by enacting
the Whistleblower Act and ignore the specific words used by the Legislature within the actual
provisions of the Act. In pursuing this argument, Ada County ignores the fact that Idaho Code §
6-2101 never uses the word "investigation" nor does it make any reference to a refusal to carry
out a directive that violates a law, rule or regulation. If, as Ada County asserts, the only words
that matter are the words used in Idaho Code § 6-2101, then the only logical conclusion is that
subsections (2) and (3) should never be enforced because nothing in Idaho Code § 6-2101
evidences any intent by the Legislature to protect those who provide information in an
investigation or refuse to carry out a directive that would result in a violation of law, rule or
regulation. Clearly, this would be an absurd reading of the statute and would utterly violate the
rule of statutory interpretation that requires this Court to view the statute as a whole and give
meaning to all its provisions.
Seeming to recognize the inherent fallacy of the argument, Ada County attempts
to assert that subsections (1), (2), and (3) of § 6-2104 "each use a different verb" and that,
therefore, the Legislature intended that a "report" of waste or violation oflaw, rule or regulation
can be accomplished by communicating a report of waste or violation oflaw, rule or regulation,
"participating or giving information in an investigation into a report of waste or violations of

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 4

law, rule or regulation; or refusing to carry out a directive that violates a law, rule or regulation."

See Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief, pp. 14-15 (emphasis added). Thus, Ada County freely
admits that in order to support its interpretation of subsection (2), words must be added to that
statutory provision as "into a report of waste or violations of law, rule or regulation" do not
appear in Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) nor do those words appear in Idaho Code § 6-2101. It is
important to recognize that Ada County is not asking this Court to interpret any of the words
used in the § 6-2104(2) in order to determine the meaning of the statute. Rather, Ada County is
very blatantly asking this Court to add words to a statutory provision that do not appear
anywhere in the statute. This, in tum, is asking this Court to ignore both its own precedent
regarding statutory interpretation and its own long-standing recognition of the relative roles of
the judiciary and the Legislature in regards to enacting legislation.
Furthermore, Ada County's interpretation of Idaho Code

§ 6-2104 is

fundamentally flawed in that while Ada County adds substantive language to subsection (2)
based on the legislative intent set forth in Idaho Code § 6-2101, it does not add "waste" to
subsection (3). Even though Ada County repeatedly asserts that the only cause of action created
by the Whistleblower Act is a cause of action for reporting waste or violation of law, rule, or
regulation, Ada County does not assert that the Legislature's intent regarding waste applies to
subsection (3). Clearly, if the legislative intent set forth in Idaho Code § 6-2101 overrides the
actual words used and the statutory provisions must be interpreted within the "umbrella" of the
legislative intent, then Idaho Code § 6-2104(3) must necessarily protect employees who refuse to
carry out a directive that might result in waste. By failing to advocate for "waste" to be included
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within subsection (3 ), Ada County recognizes that the Legislature intended to protect different
conduct within that subsection than was protected in subsection (1) or from what was specifically
mentioned in Idaho Code § 6-2101. However, if - as Ada County admits

the conduct the

Legislature intended to protect within subsection (3) is different from the conduct referenced in
Idaho Code § 6-2101, then the Legislature could also have decided to protect conduct in
subsection (2) in addition to the conduct expressly referenced in Idaho Code § 6-2101. The
legislative intent within Idaho Code § 6-2101 cannot be said to override the express language
used in Idaho Code § 6-2104 in one place, but not in another. If the legislative intent controls
over the actual words used by the Legislature in subsection (2), then it must also control over the
actual words used by the Legislature in subsection (3).
Ada County's addition of words into Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) also highlights the
most concerning aspect of Ada County's proposed interpretation of this statute. By asserting that
subsection (2) can only be harmonized with Idaho Code§ 6-2101 by reading "participates in an
investigation" as meaning "participates in an investigation into a report of waste or a violation of
law, rule, or regulation," Ada County chooses particular words to modify the statute based on its
desire for the statute to only apply in certain types of cases. But Ada County never explains
from where it draws those words. That is, Idaho Code§ 6-2101 does not contain the words "an
investigation into a report of waste or a violation of law, rule or regulation." It never mentions
investigations or similar proceedings at all. Idaho Code § 6-2101 does speak of protecting the
integrity of government, but if that is the only goal, then shouldn't subsection (2) more broadly
protect employees who participate in investigations that are in any way related to waste or a
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violation oflaw, rule or regulation? Or if the rooting out of waste and violations oflaw, rule and
regulation is the sole goal, then shouldn't employees be protected if they participate in an
investigation that makes a finding of waste or violation of law, rule or regulation, even if that
was not the original purpose of the investigation? Shouldn't the result be more important than
the original intent of the investigation in order to further the purposes of the statute? Which
words should the Court choose to fully capture the intent of the Legislature and how should this
Court make that determination? And how should the Court interpret whichever words are finally
chosen to modify the statute as written? The legislative intent codified in Idaho Code§ 6-2101
certainly does not answer that question. Ada County is asking this Court to take a very clear and
unambiguous statutory provision and not only add words to the statute, but to determine what
those words should be and how those words should be interpreted. In effect, Ada County is
asking this Court to step into the role of the Legislature in drafting statutory provisions. Nothing
in this Court's past jurisprudence or long-standing rules of statutory construction allow this
Court to take the role that Ada County attempts to thrust upon it.
This Court has previously held that "[i]f the statute is not ambiguous, this Court
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,
362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations omitted). Ada County has never asserted that Idaho
Code § 6-2104(2) is ambiguous in any way. In fact, Ada County has never asserted that the
alleged conflict between Idaho Code § 6-2101 and § 6-2104(2) makes the statute ambiguous.
Thus, this Court must simply follow the law as written. Although Ada County asserts that the
legislative intent expressed within Idaho Code § 6-2101 governs all of the other provisions, Ada
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County has cited to no case law which supports this contention. In fact, Ada County ignores this
Court's case law which has expressly held that a statute can be broader than the primary purpose
for which it was enacted. See Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265
P.3d, 502, 506 (2011). Ada County also ignores this Court's precedent which holds that "[t]he
fact that a portion of a statute has a restricted application does not similarly restrict the entire act
of which that portion was a part." See id. at 894, 265 P.3d at 507 (holding that the fact that
portions of the Idaho Peer Review Statute were limited to medical malpractice actions did not
thereby limit all portions of that statute only to medical malpractice actions where the language
of the additional provisions did not contain such limitations). In fact, the interpretation ofldaho
Code § 6-2104(2) which is urged by Ada County violates almost every rule of statutory
construction that has been recognized by this Court.
Ada County asserts that the sole role of this Court in construing a statute is to give
effect to the intent of the Legislature. Wright does not disagree with this basic assertion and, in
fact, the Court's role is clearly defined in long-standing case law. However, the best evidence of
the Legislature's intent is the actual language enacted in the statute. As this Court has stated, the
interpretation of a statute "must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole.

State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). Certainly, the legislative intent codified within Idaho Code § 6-2101 is a part of the
Whistleblower Act and is part of the whole of the statute. But it is still just a part and has no
more importance than any other provision of the statute. In this case, the Legislature chose to
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enact Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) without including any language which limited the types of
investigations which were protected by the Act. Those "literal words" of the statute must be
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning because they are the best evidence of the
Legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Therefore, this Court must hold that the District
Court erred in limiting the protections found within Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) to only those
investigations which are conducted with an eye towards uncovering waste or a violation of law,
rule or regulation.

2.

Idaho Code~ 6-2104(2) is not limitless when interpreted as written
and serves to protect the integrity of the government.

Ada County argues that interpreting Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) as written would
result in a limitless protection for employees. However, this is untrue. In fact, the protections
codified in Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) are very much limited by the express language of the statute.
The Legislature clearly stated that
To prevail in an action brought under the authority of this section,
the employee shall establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the employee has suffered an adverse action because the
employee . . . engaged or intended to engage in an activity
protected under section 6-2104, Idaho Code.
LC.§ 6-2105(4). Thus, the application ofldaho Code§ 6-2104(2) is first limited by requiring an
employee to show by the preponderance of the evidence that he or she suffered an adverse
employment action because the employee engaged in activity protected by Idaho Code § 62104(2). Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) provides:
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee
because an employee participates or gives information in an
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investigation, hearing, court-proceeding, legislative or other
inquiry, or other form of administrative review.

See LC. § 6-2104. Thus, by the express and literal words in the statute, the protections ofldaho
Code § 6-2104(2) are limited to employees who participate or give information in an
investigation, hearing, court-proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form of
administrative review. This statute does not apply to any other action by the governmental entity
or any other participation of the employee in some other activity.
Ada County asserts the statute is limitless because it could apply to the minutia of
the everyday workplace. However, a governmental entity would have to begin some kind of
investigation, hearing, court-proceeding, legislative or other review, or other form of
administrative review into that "minutia" for the statute to apply. And if the issue is important
enough that the government entity feels the need to institute such an investigation or other
covered proceeding, then it would hardly constitute "minutia." And, even if - as Ada County
asserts - such a result is "absurd," the power to correct such absurdity resides with the
Legislature not this Court. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 896, 265 P .3d at 509 ("[ w]e have never
revised or voided an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would
produce absurd results when construed as written and we do not have the authority to do so.").
Ada County further argues that because the legislative intent of the Whistleblower
Act is to protect government integrity, protecting employees who participate in investigations
over anything other than waste or a violation of law, rule or regulation is not part of that intent.
Ada County therefore appears to conclude that government integrity is only implicated when
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issues of waste or a violation of law, rule or regulation occur.

However, the integrity of

government is very much protected by ensuring that employees give truthful information into
any investigation conducted by the entity.

If a governmental entity chooses to institute an

investigation of any kind, the integrity of that investigation - and the entity conducting it - can
only be assured if the employee is free to provide truthful testimony or otherwise fully cooperate
with that investigation or other inquiry. If an employee must choose between full cooperation or
the potential of losing his or her job, the investigation will necessarily be compromised and the
integrity of the entity performing that investigation will always be in question.

Thus, the

protections granted by the plain language of Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) very clearly support the
legislative intent of protecting the integrity of government.
Lastly, Ada County asserts that limiting the protections in Idaho Code § 62104(2) will not put public employees at risk for providing testimony or other information to the
Legislature or the court when the inquiry or court proceeding does not relate to waste or a
violation of law, rule or regulation because other protections exist for such employees. Ada
County asserts that an employee "might" have protections under the First Amendment, other
statutes, constitutional provisions, or the common law. Yet, Ada County fails to cite to any other
statutes or constitutional provisions that "might" protect a public employee. And, in fact, public
employees are not protected by the common law "public policy" exception to at-will
employment.

Rather, as this Court has expressly held, "when the Legislature enacted the

Whistleblower Act, the resulting statutory cause of action displaced the common law cause of
action for breach of an at-will employment contract .... " Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 11

552, 561, 212 P.3d 982, 991 (2009). Thus, because participation in an investigation, hearing,
court-proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form of administrative review are
protected activities outlined in the Act, the Whistleblower Act is the sole cause of action upon
which a public employee can rely.
As such, a very narrow interpretation of this statute would do nothing but place a
large class of public employees in danger of experiencing adverse employment actions when
asked to participate or give information in a vast array of government investigations or other
types of government inquiries. Furthermore, public employees would have fewer protections
when complying with subpoenas than private workers.

Because the Whistleblower Act

displaced the common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, if
Ada County's interpretation is adopted by this Court, any public employee who complies with a
subpoena for any court proceeding not inquiring into waste or a violation of law, rule or
regulation could be fired with complying with the subpoena.

Thus any public employee

subpoenaed to testify as a witness in a civil trial or deposition, for example, could be fired for
that testimony.

There is simply no evidence that the Legislature intended to restrict the

protections for public employees in this manner. In fact, the plain language of Idaho Code § 62104(2) clearly indicates the Legislature actually intended to provide the broad protections that
public employees deserve in complying with investigations, court hearings, legislative inquiries,
and similar proceedings.
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3.

Even if it is required by the statute, Wright participated in an
investigation which discovered a violation of law, rule or
regulation.

Ada County next argues that Wright did not participate in an investigation which
discovered a violation of law, rule or regulation because the investigations at issue were
instituted to investigate complaints into Ada County's policy on general harassment and such
policies are not a law, rule or regulation.

Ada County asserts that because the particular

provisions of the employee handbook were adopted by resolution rather than ordinance, they are
not a law, rule or regulation.

Although the specific provisions may have been adopted by

resolution, the authority to adopt those provisions is granted in Ada County Ordinance No. 649.

See R., p. 000466, Exhibit 1 (Exhibit 5, p. ADA 1197-98).

This ordinance specifically

empowered the Ada County Board of Commissioners to prepare an employee handbook. See id.
§ 1-7-3. The ordinance further empowered the Ada County Board of Commissioners to develop
other policies and procedures as necessary for the needs of particular offices as long as such
policies did not conflict with the Ada County Employee Handbook. See id. § 1-7-5. Thus, the
general employment policies which were found to have been violated were, in fact, rules and
regulations promulgated under a county ordinance.
Ada County and the District Court cited to Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 84
P.3d 551 (2004) as support for the assertion that the Ada County employment policies were not a
law, rule or regulation as contemplated by the Act. However, Mallonee involved the alleged
violation of a state agency policy which was not promulgated under the Administrative
Procedures Act. Because the agency policy did not meet the definition of a rule or regulation
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under the state Administrative Procedures Act, it did not constitute a law, rule or regulation. See

id. at 624-25, 84 P.3d at 555-56. Ada County asserts that the same analysis applies to the
employment policies within the Ada County Employee Handbook. However, as Ada County
admits, it is not a state agency subject to the Administrative Procedures Act. Furthermore, Ada
County asserts that a rule or regulation only affects the private rights or procedures available to
the public. Yet, procedures regarding the tennination or discipline of a state employee that is set
forth within the AP A do not affect the private rights or procedures available to the public, they
affect the rights and procedures of state employees. In this case, the employee handbook which
was promulgated under Ada County Ordinance No. 649, includes policies and procedures which
affect the rights and procedures of county employees. Therefore, like rules set forth in the AP A,
the policies within that handbook have the effect of a rule or regulation.
Ada County further asserts that because there is a difference between an
ordinance and a resolution, the employee policies within the Ada County Employment
Handbook are merely internal policies that do not carry the force and effect of law. In support of
this Ada County cites to Service Employees Int'! Union Local 6 v. Idaho Dep't of Health and
Welfare, 106 Idaho 756, 759, 683 P.2d 404, 407 (1984) for the proposition that internal
management policies can be changed as necessary by an agency head because they do not carry
the force and affect of law. However, Ada County has provided no evidence or support for the
idea that the employee policies adopted by resolution of the Ada County Board of
Commissioners can be changed as necessary by the head of any department or agency within
Ada County. A resolution is still a vote by the Ada County commissioners to formally adopt or
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change policies, not simply an amendment by a department head.

Therefore, there is a

fundamental difference between employee policies formally adopted by the Ada County Board
of Commissioners and promulgated by authority from an Ada County ordinance and the internal
policies of a state agency.
Thus, because the investigations at issue in this case resulted in the finding of a
violation of law, rule or regulation or were instituted for the purpose of discovering a violation of
law, rule or regulation, the District Court erred in holding that Wright was not entitled to the
protections of the Whistleblower Act and erred in granting summary judgment on this Count of
Wright's complaint.

4.

Wright pied a cause of action under Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) and
the investigation at issue did result in a finding of waste.

Ada County next argues that it is irrelevant that one of the investigations at issue
in this case clearly resulted in a finding of waste because (a) Wright did not plead a cause of
action based on reporting waste; and (b) the investigation was not instituted based on a report of
waste.
Ada County asserts that a cause of action not pled in a complaint may not be
considered for the first time on summary judgment or on appeal. Wright does not disagree with
this statement, but the Complaint in this matter fully demonstrates that Wright pled a cause of
action based on a violation of Idaho Code § 6-2104(2). See R., p. 53. Specifically, Wright
alleged that Ada County violated the Whistleblower Act by terminating his employment because
he "initiated, coordinated, facilitated, and provided necessary information during an investigation
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of an Ada County employee .... " See R., p. 54. Ada County asserts that because the complaint
only mentions investigation into complaints of harassment, Wright failed to give Ada County
notice that he was pleading a cause of action based on allegations of waste. However, this is an
all too narrow reading of Wright's complaint.

Wright's cause of action is not based upon

allegations of harassment, it is based on suffering adverse employment action as a result of
participating in an investigation. See R., p. 54. Although Wright's complaint only references the
harassment claims as the underlying basis for the investigation, nothing in Wright's complaint
limits his cause of action to only that basis. Rather, Wright's complaint gives ample notice to
Ada County that Wright is pursuing a cause of action based on his participation in an
investigation of a particular Ada County employee. Under Idaho's notice pleading standard that
is all that is required. See, e.g., Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 13 P .3d 857 (2000).
In Cook, this Court addressed an argument by a defendant that it was subject to

unfair surprise because the plaintiffs did not include all of the facts which they ultimately based
their negligence claim on within the complaint. See id. at 33, 13 P.3d at 864. The plaintiffs had
pled a negligence cause of action based on certain conduct of the defendant and, at trial,
advanced an additional theory of negligence by the defendant.

See id.

In rejecting the

defendant's argument, the Court noted that Idaho's notice pleading system "frees parties from
pleading particular issues or theories, and allows parties to get through the door by merely stating
claims upon which relief can be granted." See id.

In this case, the allegations within the

pleadings clearly state that Wright was asserting adverse employment consequences from
participating in an investigation of an Ada County employee. Wright was not required to plead
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with particularity all of the bases or theories from his recovery under Idaho Code§ 6-2104(2).
This is particularly true where the statute under which Wright was seeking recovery does not
mention a requirement that the investigation be one that is instituted based on a report of waste
or a violation of law, rule or regulation. In effect, Ada County is seeking to punish Wright for
failing to plead a factual allegation that is nowhere required within the statute. Ada County was
well aware that Wright was asserting an adverse employment consequence for participating in
the investigation into a particular Ada County employee under Idaho Code § 6-2104(2). It was
Ada County who defended the case by asserting that only investigations into waste or a violation
of law, rule or regulation are protected by Idaho Code § 6-2104(2). Therefore, it cannot claim
unfair surprise by Wright when Wright asserts that his participation meets Ada County's own
version of the requirements of Idaho Code § 6-2104(2).

As such, the allegations that the

investigation actually resulted in a finding of waste was properly asserted at summary judgment
and on this appeal.
Because that argument was properly raised at summary judgment and on appeal,
if this Court determines that Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) somehow requires that the investigation be
related to a finding of waste or a violation of law, rule or regulation, the District Court still erred
in granting summary judgment.

As was fully set forth within Plaintiffs Opening Brief on

Appeal, the investigator in the 2011 investigation made very clear findings of waste of Ada
County resources, manpower and money. Ada County's only argument on this issue is that such
findings are irrelevant because the investigation was not instituted as a result of a report of waste.
Thus, as was discussed earlier, Ada County is arguing that waste is an absolutely necessary part
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of any cause of action under Idaho Code § 6-2104(2), but that the Legislature only intended to
protect governmental integrity as it relates to reports of waste, not the actual finding of any
waste. Therefore, under Ada County's argument, the Idaho Legislature deliberately intended to
protect an employee who participates in an investigation which begins based on a report of waste
but which never finds any waste, but deliberately intended not to protect an employee who
participates in an investigation which actually results in a finding of waste. Ada County asserts
that it is therefore only the intent of the investigation that matters, not the result. Yet Ada
County still fails to cite to any language in the statute that would support that distinction. A
"report" of waste could institute the investigation, or an investigation which finds waste could
itself be a "report" of waste sufficient to satisfy the alleged sole legislative intent of the statute.
The inherent fallacy of Ada County's repeated and convoluted attempts to limit the statutory
language is again clear in the arbitrary and unsupp01ied distinctions drawn when Ada County's
version of the statute is applied to this case.
Ada County also asserts that a waste of county resources, manpower, and money
as found in the investigator's report is not "waste" within the meaning of the Whistleblower Act.
Although "waste" is not defined within the definitions set forth in Idaho Code § 6-2103, Idaho
Code § 6-2104(1) references a "waste of public funds, property or manpower."

See id.

(emphasis added). Furthermore, in Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,
224 P.3d 458 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court held that an employee who had documented
notes about her co-workers using office time on personal conversations had documented waste.
See id. at 399, 224 P.3d at 466. Specifically, the Court noted that the underlying facts included
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that the employee "maintained a detailed, handwritten, minute-by-minute log of activities
engaged in by her co-workers which Curlee deemed to be wasteful." See id. at 393, 224 P.3d at
460. The Court further noted that the conduct which prompted this documentation was the
"inordinate amount of time [the other employees] spent on personal conversations during the
workday." See id. Ada County asserts that the definition of "waste" was not raised as a specific
issue in the Curlee appeal and, therefore, the Court's statements are immaterial. However, the
Court directly addressed whether those notes constituted a report of waste. See id. Therefore, if
those notes did not document "waste" they could not have constituted a report of waste.
Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how improper use of county time and county resources
as well as an actual loss of money, as is documented in the findings of the 2011 investigation, do
not constitute a waste of public funds, property or manpower. Thus, under the plain language of
the statute, the 2011 investigation did find waste and, therefore, even if the legislative intent of
Idaho Code § 6-2101 must be read into Idaho Code § 6-2104(2), summary judgment was
improperly granted to Ada County in this case and the District Court's decision must be reversed
and this case remanded for fu1iher proceedings.

B.

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on Wright's
Claim under the Family Medical Leave Act.

Within the District Court's original decision granting summary judgment to Ada
County on Wright's claim for interference with FMLA rights, the court held that because the
commissioners were unaware of Wright's FMLA request at the time the decision was made to
terminate his employment, there was no evidence of interference with Wright's request for an
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FMLA benefit. See R., p. 000307-000308. The District Court erred in granting the motion for
summary judgment on this basis because FMLA law regarding an interference claim establishes
that the employer's intent, good faith, and lack of knowledge are irrelevant.
Although Ada County repeatedly asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment
because Wright's termination was not based on taking FMLA, that argument is irrelevant to the
issues raised by Wright. The provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act clearly provide that an
employer can be liable for interfering with an employee's approved leave. "It shall be unlawful
for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any
right provided under this title [29 U.S.C.S. § 261 et seq.]." 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l), see also

Sanders v. City a/Newport, 657 F.3d 772 (9th Cir 2011).
"In interference claims, the employer's intent is irrelevant to a determination of
liability. Id. at 657 F.3d 778. "'Employer motive plays no role in a claim for substantive denial
of benefits."' Id. (quoting Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 960 (10th
Cir. 2002). Under an interference claim the Plaintiff only need show he was entitled to the leave
and the Defendants' conduct interfered with that entitlement. Id. at 657 F.3d 781. Only if the
employee has alleged retaliation or impermissible use of the leave as a factor in termination does
the employee have a burden to show that the FMLA leave was a basis for the termination. Liu v.

Amway, 347 F.3d 1125, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2003).

In an interference case, the employee is

protected "from any employer actions that discourage or interfere with the right to take FMLA
leave." Id., 347 F.3d at 1134 (emphasis in the original).
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Thus, Ada County's arguments

regarding the lack of evidence that the termination of employment was based on taking FMLA
leave are irrelevant.
Under the FMLA, there are five elements necessary for Wright to establish an
interference claim, namely: (1) he was eligible for the FMLA's protections, (2) his employer was
covered by the FMLA, (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided sufficient
notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his employer denied him FMLA benefits to which he
was entitled.

Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir 2011).

These five

elements, "only require an employee to prove that she was entitled to FMLA benefits and that
'h[er] employer denied h[er] FMLA benefits to which [s]he was entitled."' Id, 657 F.3d at 781
(quoting Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 477 (7 th Cir. 2006) (reversing because the trial
court's action in requiring plaintiff to prove the employer did not have reasonable cause to
terminate her was a prejudicial addition of an element of the interference claim)).
The only element of this claim challenged by Ada County is that it had a
legitimate, non-FMLA reason for interfering with Wright's entitlement to FMLA leave.
However, Ada County's only argument on this issue is that Wright was terminated due to a
reorganization, not his FMLA leave. In the event that the employer claims a legitimate reason
for denying the employee his benefits under FMLA, the burden is upon the employer to establish
a legitimate, non FMLA reason exists. Sanders v. City a/Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir
2011) (rejecting the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis in FMLA interference claims).
Ada County asserts that a "legitimate" basis for termination of employment is synonymous with
a "non-FMLA" basis for the termination. However, there would be no reason for courts to use
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both terms if they meant the same thing. Rather, it is clear that the federal courts have allowed
employers to avoid liability under the FMLA only when the reason for termination was both
"legitimate" and non-FMLA related.

The rationale behind such a holding is clear.

If an

employee is entitled to FMLA leave, an employer cannot interfere with that right. Terminating
an employee's employment for an illegal, unlawful, or illegitimate reason would be allowing the
employer to illegally interfere with a benefit to which the employee was otherwise lawfully
entitled. In contrast, under established case law, an employee who is terminated for a legitimate,
non-FMLA reason is not actually entitled to FMLA leave and therefore the termination does not
interfere with any benefit to which the employee was entitled. However, terminating Wright's
employment in violation of Idaho law cannot be a "legitimate" basis for interfering with
Wright's legally entitled FMLA benefits. Therefore, because there are genuine issues of fact for
the jury to decide regarding Wright's termination of employment, summary judgment on
Wright's claim under the FMLA was not appropriate and the District Court's decision should be
reversed.
Additionally, the District Court held, and Ada County has argued on appeal, that
because Ada County extended Wright's termination date for thirty days, there was no
interference with his benefit. However, this mischaracterizes the benefit to which Wright was
entitled. He had requested, and been approved, for intermittent leave under the FMLA. Ada
County asserts that because Wright was certified only for thirty days, that is all the intermittent
leave to which he was entitled.

This argument ignores that Ada County policies required

recertification of intermittent leave every 30 days. See R., p. 000466, Exhibit 1 (Exhibit 5, p.
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ADA 1406). Ada County admits that FMLA allows an employee to take leave "in separate
blocks of time due to a single qualifying reason." See 29 C.F.R. § 825.202(a). Ada County
further admits that an employee is entitled to inte1mittent leave for up to 12 weeks of FMLA
leave a year. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.205(b).
Because Ada County's policies required recertification for intermittent leave
every thirty (30) days, Wright could not request intennittent leave for a longer period of time.
Thus, Wright's medical condition was not limited to thirty days, his ability to apply for leave was
so limited by Ada County's policies. Wright did not apply for additional leave in February of
2013 because his employment had been terminated by the county and any such application
would have been futile. Had such a termination of employment not occurred, Wright would
have requested additional leave.

As long as his health condition necessitated continued

intermittent leave, Wright was entitled to such leave. Therefore, there is a factual dispute as to
whether the County provided Wright with all the benefits he was entitled to under the FMLA.
As such, Wright respectfully asserts that the District Court erred in granting Ada County's
motion for summary judgment on this claim as both the issue of liability and damages in
Wright's FMLA interference claim are factual disputes which are to be determined by the jury.
C.

Summary Judgment should be Reversed on Wright's Claim for
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.

The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order granted summary
judgment on Wright's claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress on the grounds that
Wright failed to establish a breach of a duty that would support such a claim. The District Court
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held that because the Court granted summary judgment on the Whistleblower claim, there was
no breach of any duty. See R., p. 000309-000310. However, as was set forth in detail above, the
District Court erred in granting summary judgment on Wright's claim under the Whistleblower
Act. Therefore, the basis for the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment was
improper and summary judgment should not have been granted on this claim.
Additionally, Ada County has argued that the NIED claim was properly dismissed
because such damages are not available under the Whistleblower Act.

In support of this

argument, Ada County cites to Idaho Code§ 6-2106 which provides that "[a] court, in rendering
a judgment brought under this chapter, may order any or all of the following:
(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions of this act;
(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before the
adverse action, or to an equivalent position;
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights;
(4) The compensation for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration;
(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees;
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500),
which shall be submitted to the state treasurer for deposit in the general fund.
LC. § 6-2106 (emphasis added). Ada County asserts that this statute limits the relief the Court
may award to the specific items enumerated.
However, Ada County's reliance solely on Idaho Code § 6-2106 ignores the
provisions ofldaho Code§ 6-2105. This statute specifically defines "damages" as "damages for
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injury or loss caused by each violation of this chapter .... " LC.§ 6-2105(1). The statute further
states that "[a]n employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action for
appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both .... " LC. § 2105(2). Thus, the statute
clearly and plainly allows a plaintiff to recover damages and defines those damages as damages
for "injury or loss" caused by a violation of the act. While Idaho Code § 6-2106 may enumerate
the types of "losses" that can be compensated, nothing in that provision provides any
enumeration of compensation for injury. Therefore, applying § 6-2106 as the exclusive remedies
available to an employee would render the use of "injury" in § 6-2105 meaningless.
In fact, after spending a large portion of its brief asserting that one portion of the
Whistleblower Act must necessarily infuse all other provisions of the Act, Ada County now
argues that Idaho Code§ 6-2106 must be read entirely separately and independently of§ 6-2105.
In so arguing, Ada County ignores the long-standing principle of statutory construction that a
statute must be construed as a whole and that any one section should not be read in a vacuum.
See Lockhart v. Dep 't of Fish and Game, 121 Idaho 894, 897, 828 P .2d 1299, 1302 (1992); State
v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). In this case, the statutory language of

Idaho Code § 6-2105, when read in conjunction with the permissive rather than mandatory
language set forth in Idaho Code § 6-2106, indicates that the Whistleblower Act contemplates
damages other than those specifically listed within the statute.
This exact interpretation was adopted by the federal district court in Brown v. City
of Caldwell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143552. In rejecting the same argument advanced by Ada

County in this case, the federal district court recognized that the statute had to be construed as a
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whole to give effect to both provisions. See id. at *3. While the federal district court decision is
not binding precedent on this Court, Wright respectfully asserts that it properly analyzes the
question. Allowing Wright to pursue his claim for emotional distress clearly fits within the
provisions of§ 6-2105(1) as allowing Wright to recover for his injury sustained as a result of the
violation of the Act. Therefore, the District Court's grant of summary judgment on Wright's
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress should be reversed and the claim should be
remanded for trial.

D.

The District Court Properly Denied Ada County Attorney Fees Below.

Ada County next argues that the District Court erred in denying Ada County its
attorney fees below. As Ada County admits, the denial of attorney fees is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See Hymas v. Meridian Police Dep't, 156 Idaho 739, 330 P.3d 1097 (Ct. App. 2014).
In reviewing a decision for an abuse of discretion, this Court must detennine whether the lower
court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaiies of
such discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards to the particular choices
before it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. See id.
Idaho Code § 6-2107 only allows attorney fees and costs to be awarded to an
employer if the court determines the action brought by an employee was without basis in law or
fact. See id. Idaho Code § 12-117 also requires a showing that the opposing party acted without
a reasonable basis in fact or law. See id. These are the only two bases upon which Ada County
sought an award of fees and costs. Ada County asserts that it is entitled to fees because Wright
advanced arguments in disregard to the plain language of the Whistleblower Act and, therefore,
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was without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Ada County further asserts that even if the
appellate court had not decided the issue, when the statutory language is clear enough to
contradict the argument made, attorney fees are still warranted.
As is fully set forth above, Wright's arguments on the issues related to the
Whistleblower Act and the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim were not frivolous
and had a clear basis in both law and fact. Ada County asserts the arguments were frivolous
because they are "in direct contradiction of the plainly stated legislative intent in the
Whistleblower Act." See Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief, p. 44. Thus, Ada County does
not even assert that Wright's argument was in clear contradiction to the actual language of the
statute, just the legislative intent of the statute. Essentially, Ada County is arguing that when an
employee relies on the plain and specific language in a statutory provision, that argument has no
reasonable basis in law.
This Court has never awarded fees in such a situation. Rather, this Court has held
that "[w]here issues of first impression are raised, attorney fees will not be awarded." See Saint
Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Cent. v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 862,863,204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009). This
Court has never addressed the issue of whether a codified legislative intent in one provision of
the statute overrides the actual language used in other portions of the statute. Ada County has
cited to no case which specifically addresses this issue. In fact, the case which most closely
parallels the statutory interpretation issues in this case, Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr.,
151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011), actually supports Wright's position regarding how the
express language of the statute should apply. It is simply outrageous to assert that Wright's
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argument in this case is frivolous and without a reasonable basis in law. Wright has relied on the
specific statute provision applicable to his claim and has made entirely reasonable arguments as
to how the rules of statutory interpretation and this Court's precedent support his argument and
require a reversal of the District Court's decision.

To award attorney fees under these

circumstances would be to change Idaho Code § 6-2107 and § 12-117 into nothing more than a
prevailing party statute and that was clearly not the intent of the legislature in enacting either
prov1s10n.
The District Court clearly recognized this in denying Ada County's request for
fees below.

The District Court issued a separate Memorandum Decision on Ada County's

request for attorney fees. See R., p. 447. Within that Decision, the District Court cited to the
specific standards applicable to an award of fees under Idaho Code § 6-2107 and § 12-117, and
recognized that the issue was one of discretion. See R., p. 450-451. The District Court then
specifically noted that although it disagreed with Wright's theory of the case, Wright's
arguments were not so unreasonable as to require the court to impose an award of attorney fees
under Idaho Code § 6-2107. See R., p. 451.

This decision was entirely within the District

Court's discretion and Ada County has provided no basis for overturning that exercise of
discretion. Similarly, the District Court recognized that fees were mandatory under Idaho Code
§ 12-117, but only if the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. See

R., p. 451. The District Court then specifically held that Wright's claims for negligent infliction
of emotional distress were not without foundation. See R., p. 451-452. The District Court's
decision clearly demonstrates that the District Court recognized the issue as one of discretion and
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appropriately exercised that discretion. As such, there is no basis for reversing the District
Court's decision denying Ada County's request for attorney fees.
Ada County also asserts that the District Court erred because it failed to assess
whether Ada County should have been awarded fees incurred after the filing of its summary
judgment motion. Ada County argues that because Idaho Code§ 6-2107 provides a safe harbor
for employees who voluntarily dismiss claims "within a reasonable time after determining that
the employer would not be liable for damages," they should have been awarded fees incurred
after filing the summary judgment motion. This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, as
has been fully argued in this case, nothing in Ada County's summary judgment motion provided
Wright with a basis to believe that Ada County would not be liable for damages.
Second, this "safe harbor" provision does not provide an independent basis for
attorney fees. Rather, when the statutory provision is read as a whole, all it does is provide a
basis for an employee to avoid attorney fees on a claim that was otherwise without basis in law
or fact if they dismiss such claim within a reasonable time of making that determination. See
I. C. § 6-2107. Furthermore, this provision does not provide a different standard for an award of

attorney fees. Therefore, because the District Court clearly held that Wright's arguments were
not frivolous or without foundation in opposing Ada County's motion for summary judgment,
there was no basis for awarding fees to Ada County under the "safe harbor" provision of Idaho
Code § 6-2107, even if that provision provided an independent basis for an award of attorney
fees. Therefore, the District Court properly exercised its discretion in denying attorney fees to
Ada County and that denial of attorney fees must be upheld.
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E.

Ada County is not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Ada County also asserts that it is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. The only
arguments offered to support this claim are those which were also offered in support of its claim
for attorney fees below. For the reasons fully set forth above, this claim should be denied.
Wright's arguments regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) are entirely
reasonable and are based on the express language of that statutory provision.

Furthermore,

nothing in Idaho Code § 6-2104(2) is in direct conflict with the legislative intent set forth in
Idaho Code § 6-2101.

Rather, as was discussed previously, Idaho Code § 6-2101 makes

absolutely no reference to investigations, hearings or similar proceedings.

Thus, Wright's

argument is not clearly contradictory to any express statutory language in the Whistleblower Act.
As this Court has never addressed the issue of whether the legislative intent set forth in a
provision of a statute overrides the express language used in another provision of the statute, this
is an issue of first impression and it would be patently unjust to subject Wright to an award of
attorney fees for asking this Court to resolve this issue.
Wright has set forth reasonable arguments based on existing rules of statutory
interpretation and the express language of the statute. He has offered facts to demonstrate that
his claims fit within the conduct protected by the statute.

Wright has provided citations to

relevant and applicable precedent and persuasive authorities to support his legal arguments.
Simply because the District Court ultimately disagreed with those arguments and Wright has
asked this Court to review that decision does not render Wright's argument on appeal frivolous,
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unreasonable, or without foundation. As such, Ada County's request for attorney fees on appeal
must be denied.
F.

Wright is Entitled to Attorney Fees 011 Appeal

Within Wright's Opening Brief on Appeal, Wright specifically requested an
award of attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 6-2106(5).

Ada County offered no

argument within its Respondent/Cross-Appellant's brief that if Wright prevails on this appeal, he
is not entitled to attorney fees. If this Court finds Wright to be the prevailing party on this
appeal, Idaho Code § 6-2106(5) provides that the Court may award attorney fees and costs to
Wright. In exercising the discretion within that statute, Wright asks this Court to consider the
arguments advanced by Wright in support of his interpretation of the Whistleblower Act, as well
as Ada County's accusations of frivolous and unreasonable conduct by Wright in advancing
those arguments. Wright respectfully requests that the Court award attorney fees to Wright on
appeal.
III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth within Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal, as well as
the arguments set forth above, Wright respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District
Court's decision granting Ada County's Motion for Summary Judgment and remand this matter
to the District Court for further proceedings including but not limited to trial.
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